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1. Reason and rules of rationality
Human beings are animals, and one feature which distinguishes us animals from plants is that
we act. We have wills. Yet although all animals have wills, one feature which distinguishes us
human beings from other animals is that we act self-consciously. We have practical reason.
What is the relationship between practical reason and the will? One view is that the will
is one capacity, practical reason another, and exercises of practical reason influence those of our
will  when we exercise both well.1 How else could all  animals have a will  but only we have
practical reason? That question, though, has an answer. Perhaps practical reason is our will. As
different animals have different types of stomachs, so maybe they have different types of wills.
‘Practical reason’ would then be the name for the self-conscious will, unique, as far as we know,
to us human beings.
Call this view practical cognitivism. It is the crux of certain Aristotelian and Kantian trends
in practical philosophy.2 The trends are Aristotelian because Aristotle says that  ‘action is the
conclusion of practical reasoning’ (Aristotle 1984: 701a13). They are Kantian because Kant says
that ‘The will is nothing other than practical reason’ (Kant 1785: 4:412). In this essay, I assume
it  and  argue  that  it  grounds  a  unique  account  of  the  nature  and  normative  status  of  the
instrumental rule, a rule of rationality which links means to ends.
An account  of  this  rule  must  explain  what  makes  it  a  rule  of  rationality  and what
distinguishes it from others. Many assume that such rules  ‘require just that our attitudes be
formally coherent’ and that what differentiates this one is then which attitudes it concerns: (1)
an intention for an end, (2) a belief about means necessary for that end, and (3) an intention for
those means (Kolodny 2008: 366).3  These philosophers  assume this account because their
questions are not  ‘What is a rule of rationality?’  or ‘What is the content of the instrumental
rule?’ Their questions are ‘Are requirements of formal coherence normative?’ or ‘What is the
normative status of a rule which says to intend means I believe necessary for my end?’ They
* Thanks to John Broome, Rachel Fraser, Nicholas Koziolek, Thomas Pendlebury, an audience at the University of 
Oxford, and an exemplary anonymous referee for this journal.
1 See (Fix 2018) for criticism.
2 See, among others, (Rödl 2007),  (Tenenbaum 2007), (Thompson 2008), (Korsgaard 2008), (Fernandez 2016),
(Ford 2016), (Lavin 2017), and (Marcus 2018).
3 See, among others,  (Broome 1999: 410), (Wallace 2001: 101), (Scanlon 2007: 84), (Setiya 2007: 652), (Way
2012: 488), (Bratman 2009: 52), and (Brunero 2012: 125).
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grant that accounts of the nature of normativity shape answers to those questions. For example,
in  ‘Why  be  Rational?’,  Niko  Kolodny  addresses  not  that  titular  question  but  instead  the
question ‘If nonreductionism takes the ‘ought’ of reasons to be primitive, then how does it
understand  the  ‘ought’  of  rationality?’  (Kolodny  2005:  512)  He  treats  this  assumption  as
disputable and exempts dissenters from the ambit of his argument. Yet he does not treat his
assumptions about  the nature  of  rationality and about  the  content of  the instrumental  rule
likewise.
These assumptions are endemic to discussions about rules of rationality. Many discuss
these issues in terms of a distinction between substantive rationality, understood as standards I
meet by correctly responding to reasons, and  structural  rationality, understood as standards I
meet by having coherent mental states. That distinction structures others, like the one between
instrumental  transmission,  understood  as  a  rule  of  substantive  rationality  concerning  when
reasons transmit from an end to its means, and  the instrumental rule, understood as a rule of
structural  rationality concerning mental states about means and ends ((Kolodny 2018)  and
(Kiesewetter 2018)). Discussions thus framed are as conditional as Kolodny’s question. After all,
reject  those  assumptions  about  normativity  and  rationality  and  these  distinctions,  and  the
discussions so framed, are empty.
I do not object to projects which unfold an assumption. Unless their conditionality is
acknowledged, though, an optional approach to a topic might illegitimately seem to define the
topic approached. I will here establish that optionality by example. I shall present a version of
constitutivism inspired by those Aristotelian and Kantian trends which grounds the standard for
exercises of a capacity in the nature of that capacity. I will eventually explain what it says about
the normative status of the instrumental rule. My focus, though, is on its account of the content
of that rule. I shall first argue that it implies that rules of rationality partially specify the nature of
self-conscious capacities. They tell us what a specific self-conscious capacity is a potentiality to
do. The content of the instrumental rule then depends on the nature of practical reason. 
I will argue that if practical cognitivism is true, the standard interpretation of that rule
answers these questions incorrectly:
1. Is it about necessary or sufficient means?
2. Is it about intending or taking means?
3. Is it about believed or actual means?
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The standard interpretation says to  intend means I  believe necessary for my end. My alternative
says to take means  actually sufficient for my end. Since this alternative follows from explicitly
assuming that practical reason is our will, the standard interpretation implicitly assumes it is
not. I shall argue that this alternative explains everything the standard interpretation can and
more into the bargain, including grounding certain correctness conditions for exercises of our
will unexplained by the standard interpretation. Hence, an account of our agency must include
this alternative, and there is then nothing for the standard interpretation to explain.
After  explaining that  alternative,  I  will  discuss  its  normative  status by addressing an
objection which says that it licenses a form of bootstrapping in which having an end makes
taking means correct. Since I can have improper ends, bootstrapping is illegitimate. A rule which
licenses it lacks normative status. Given the constitutivist metaphysics, though, this rule does
not  license  bootstrapping  because  meeting  it  is  a  necessary  but  insufficient  correctness
condition for exercises of practical reason. I explain how trying to state the objection within this
metaphysics is self-undermining.
The instrumental rule matters because taking means to ends is a mark of finite agency.
An animal needs to do more than think to get much of anything done. While any animal must
take means to ends to succeed in action, self-conscious animals are those whose thought and
action is structured by their at least tacit grasp of rules of rationality to which they are subject.
This is what Kant means when he says that ‘everything in nature works in accordance with laws.
Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is,
in accordance with principles’ (Kant 1785: 4:412). Meeting the instrumental rule is part of what
it is for something to be a well-formed practical representation. Instrumental thought, and so the
instrumental  rule,  is  thus  at  the  core  of  our  agency.  An  improper,  because  incomplete,
formulation, such as the standard interpretation, leads to a merely partial account of our agency
as an account of what it is to add 2 is an improper, because incomplete, account of addition. It
leads to an account of our practical activity on which most of it, which involves taking non-
necessary contributory means which are jointly sufficient for our ends when all goes well, is
outside the ambit of reason.
This essay cannot first establish a constitutive metaphysics of practical reason as our will
and then spell out an account of the instrumental rule. The central question of this essay is thus
as qualified as Kolodny’s question. It is ‘If constitutivism is true and practical reason is our will,
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what  is  the  content  of  the  instrumental  rule  and what  is  its  normative  status?’  An answer
articulates some of the structure and significance of practical cognitivism. Whether that view is
correct turns on whether it rings true on reflection. To find out, we must understand it. To do
so, we must develop it. This essay is part of that project.
2. The contours of a capacity
In this section, I present a constitutivist metaphysics of capacities and explain what it implies
about the nature of rationality.4 I discuss practical reason in the next section.
2.1 As I use the term, a capacity is a potentiality to do something, ranging from the nutritional
activities of plants and animals to the conscious and self-conscious activities of animals. It does
not include everything in the life of an organism. Whereas walking is an activity, being burnt to a
crisp is not. The potentiality to walk is a capacity of mine. The potentiality to burn is not.
Exercises of capacities are thus doings of organisms.
One capacity differs from another given what they are potentialities to do. My capacity to
confide differs from my capacity to keep a secret, say, given how confiding differs from keeping a
secret. An account of the nature of a capacity thus mirrors an account of an activity. As we might
put it, the principle that describes the nature of a capacity spells out what it is a potentiality to
do. And that principle is a standard for its exercise. If I exercise my capacity to confide with
respect to my crush about my feelings for him, to convey is correct, to conceal incorrect. If I
instead exercise my capacity to keep a secret, to conceal is correct, to convey incorrect. Which
capacity I exercise thus determines the standard operative.
Exercises of capacities can be correct or incorrect because an organism can succeed or
fail  in doing something. Although I can successfully or unsuccessfully confide and thus can
exercise that capacity correctly or not, I cannot burn to a crisp successfully or unsuccessfully.
Capacities are thus potentialities whose exercises are by nature subject to a standard. In my
terminology, a capacity is such that a principle describes its nature and is thereby normative for
its exercise.  An exercise is correct to the extent that and because it  meets that principle by
possessing the properties mentioned in the principle, incorrect to the extent that and because it
does not.
4 I develop this metaphysics in (Fix 2020). I explain constitutivism generally in (Fix forthcoming). See also (Foot
2001), (Thompson 2008), (Korsgaard 2009), (Lavin 2017), and (Schafer 2019)
4
2.2 Since  practical  and theoretical  reason can be  exercised correctly  or  incorrectly,  they are
capacities  with  principles  which  describe  their  nature  and  are  thereby  normative  for  their
exercises. On this metaphysics, rules of rationality are whatever partially specify the nature of
those capacities. Here is why.
To follow the instrumental rule or modus ponens, say, is to exercise the aspect of the
mind which distinguishes us from the other animals. It is to exercise reason. If an exercise in
part consists in following such a rule, reason is in part a capacity to follow that rule. To be a rule
of rationality, then, is to partially specify the nature of reason. So a rule of practical rationality
partially specifies the nature of practical reason, a rule of theoretical rationality the nature of
theoretical reason.
Practical  and theoretical reason are thus capacities whose exercises are correct to the
extent that and because I meet the rules of rationality by possessing the properties mentioned in
those rules. I do not mean that to exercise them correctly is to follow a set of rules picked out by
their  content.  The constitutivist  metaphysics identifies rules of  rationality by their  role in the
account of a self-conscious capacity. Their content depends on what practical and theoretical
reason are potentialities to do.
3. The self-conscious will
In this section, I explain what practical reason is a potentiality to do if it is our will. In the next, I
explain which interpretation of the instrumental rule follows. A caveat: I shall discuss only those
aspects  relevant  to  interpreting  the  instrumental  rule.  Christine  Korsgaard  argues  that  they
presuppose further aspects which ground moral requirements (Korsgaard 2009: 70-2).  I will
remain agnostic about whether they presuppose or are merely compatible with others.
3.1 If  practical  reason is our will,  its  principle  is  a specific determination of the one which
characterizes a will in general just as the function of our heart is a specific determination of the
generic function of a heart. Hearts circulate blood. Ours does so in a specific way. What, then, is
a will? How does ours do in a specific way what a will in general does?
An exercise of a will is complete only when the animal acts. Yet an animal succeeds not
by simply acting but by pulling off the action. Take my cat on his way toward me on the settee.
He succeeds when he jumps up, kneads me, and lies on top of me. His exercise of his will is
complete only when he finishes doing what he is doing such that he is no longer -ing and hasφ
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-ed. φ He can fail. Maybe he misses the jump, or perhaps I toss him aside because he kneads too
long or rough. He is no longer -ingφ  but has not -edφ . He was -ing but did not .φ φ  But maybe
this time he succeeds, no longer acting but now having acted. His exercise of his will is only
then complete. Acting as he wills to act is thus part of the standard for exercises of his will.
Given the constitutivist metaphysics, it is part of the nature of his will. As with his will, so with
any. As we might put it, a will is in part a capacity to realize the object of its representations.5
As with the feline will, so with the human. Say I aim to read The Tunnel  at the pace at
which William Gass composed it. I succeed only if I finish the book twenty-eight years after
starting it. My exercise of my will is complete only when I am no longer -ing and have -edφ φ . I
can fail. Maybe someone casts all copies to the flames. I am then no longer -ing but have notφ
-ed. Iφ  was  -ing but did not .φ φ  But perhaps this time I succeed, no longer acting but now
having acted. 
 Of course, I differ from my cat. I am self-conscious, which transforms the nature of the
activity and capacity. This self-consciousness is not grand. My kid nephew is an exemplar. Any
game involves house rules which he enforces while exploiting opportunities they make possible.
That is self-consciousness in action. It is why I can follow a rule and know what I am doing and
why.  It  is  why  ignorance  is  an  error.  A  full  account  of  our  will  must  explain  this  self-
consciousness,  of  which  I  provide  only  a  part  in  the  next  sub-section.  Even  absent  that
explanation, though, if pactical reason is our will, its exercise is complete only when I act as
willed just like any other type of will. Acting as I will to act is thus part of the standard for
exercises of practical  reason. Given the constitutivist  metaphysics, it  is part of  the nature of
practical reason. As we might put it in order to mark its distinctive self-consciousness, practical
reason is in part a capacity to realize concepts.
3.2 An exercise of practical reason succeeds only if I get something done. Thought is enough for
God to shape the world and for me to know it. For me to shape the world, though, requires
more. Since this difference between practical and theoretical reason matters for the answers to
the questions about the content of the instrumental rule, let me explain it.
An exercise of theoretical reason about a donkey chomping on a soup can, say, is correct
5 I here allude to Kant’s claim that ‘the faculty of desire is a being’s faculty to be by means of its representations the
cause of the reality of the objects of these representations’ (Kant 1788: 5:9n). He also claims that the ‘faculty of desire
whose inner determining ground … lies within the subject’s reason is called the will’ (Kant 1797: 6:213). As I say
that animals have wills and ‘practical reason’ is the name for the self-conscious type, so he says that animals have
faculties of desire and ‘the will’ is the name for the rational type. Terminology differs, but the view is the same.
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only if such a beast of burden is chewing a can. Whether that is so does not depend on my
thought  about  her.  The object  of  my theoretical  representation is  thus independent  of  that
representation.  Because  theoretical  reason  is  a  self-conscious  capacity,  I  recognize  this
independence in a correct exercise of it. That is why it is a mark of madness to think that what
that donkey is up to depends on my thought about her. 
That mark of madness in an exercise of theoretical reason, though, is a mark of maturity
in an exercise of practical reason. Such an exercise about confiding in you is correct only if I tell
you a tale by which you come to know my mind. Whether I am confiding depends on my
representation of what is happening. You might come to know my secrets as sounds escape in
my sleep, but that no more constitutes confiding than cheating with counterfeit cash constitutes
commerce. I am not acting because those sounds do not realize a representation. You might
instead come to know my secrets as I  recite  them without knowing about the microphone
broadcasting to the school. I am acting but not confiding because although those sounds realize
a representation, it is the wrong one. In contrast, if I summon the trust and courage to tell you
what I have so long been afraid to say, I am confiding. I realize that concept. The object of my
practical representation thus depends on that representation. Because practical reason is a self-
conscious capacity, I recognize this depedence in a correct exercise of it. I recognize that what I
am up to, and indeed whether I am up to anything, depends on my thought about it. 
The thinking that partially constitutes an exercise of practical reason is thus about the
doing that is the other part of that exercise. The doing that partially constitutes an exercise of
practical reason realizes the thinking that is the other part of that exercise. Each is what it is
because of its relationship to the other. Part of what it is to be self-conscious is to understand
this relationship in a way which grounds responsibility for securing it and failing to do so in an
exercise of my will. For practical reason to be in part a capacity to realize concepts, then, is for
thinking and doing to be interdependent parts of its exercise. It is for doing to realize thinking
about doing—for action to realize thought about action—at least when I exercise that capacity
well.6
4. The content of the instrumental rule
In this section, I answer the three questions about the content of the instrumental rule. Each
answer has the following structure:
6 For more on the transformative nature of self-consciousness, see (Boyle 2016) and (Marcus forthcoming).
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1. If practical reason is our will, its exercise succeeds only if I act as willed.
2. Following the standard interpretation is not enough for me to act as willed.
3. Following the alternative interpretation is enough for me to act as willed.
The standard interpretation, which says to intend means I believe necessary to my end, does not
explain that correctness condition. My alternative, which says to take means actually sufficient for
my end, does. So,  an account of practical  reason must include a rule about taking actually
sufficient means. Once it does, there is nothing for a rule about intending believed necessary
means to explain.
4.1 I  aim  here  to  co-opt  an  explanation  which  some  philosophers  offer  for the  standard
interpretation. Let me explain what I mean before I address the questions individually.
Kant claims that the hypothetical imperative says that ‘whoever wills the end also wills
(insofar as reason has decisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary means to it
that are within his power’ (Kant 1785: 4:417). That appears to be the standard interpretation.
His explanation of the analyticity of this imperativity, though, gives the lie to that appearance.
He claims that this imperative merely  ‘extracts the concept of actions necessary to this end
merely from the concept of a volition of this end’ because ‘in the volition of an object as my
effect, my causality as acting cause, that is the use of means, is already thought’ ( ibid.: 4:417).
In effect, to will an end is to set about realizing it, which grounds the hypothetical imperative. To
realize an end, though, is to take  sufficient means to it,  which involves taking any necessary
means but requires more.7 What is already thought in willing an end is thus taking sufficient
means, not merely intending necessary ones.8
Stephen Finlay offers a scrubbed up version of this explanation:
the expression,  “to intend the end y,” is significantly incomplete. Intention has to do
7 (Lee 2018a)  cites this explanation without realizing it  undermines the interpretation of the rule meant to be
explained. Given this explanation of the analyticity of this imperative, I doubt that Kant is using the contemporary
notion of a necessary means. I suspect that he means what my boss means when he says ‘Do whatever is necessary
to get the job done’, which order I carry out only by taking sufficient means. Since this essay is not an exercise in
Kant scholarship, though, I shall not push the issue.
8 Kant  then argues  that  the  syntheticity  of  propositions  about  means  to  specific  ends  does  not  threaten the
analyticity of the hypothetical imperative. Since propositions about sufficient means are as synthetic as ones about
necessary means, this argument fits with an imperative about either type.
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with action: what is intended is always action (or inaction) of some sort. To intend the
end y, therefore, is really to intend to act so as to bring the end y about. Now observe
that the expression, “to intend the necessary means z,” is similarly incomplete. Talk of
the “necessary means” implicitly invokes the end, so that to intend the necessary means
is to intend to act so as to bring the end y about. Intending the end, therefore, simply is
intending  the  necessary  means  to  that  end—the  two  locutions  give  partial  and
complementary descriptions of the same intention, so one logically cannot intend an
end without intending the necessary means.         (Finlay 2009: 163)
However,  if  ‘intend the end’ ‘partially describes’ an intention and if ‘to intend the end is to
intend to act so as to bring the end about’, the only way to ‘complete’ that description is with
‘intend sufficient means’. After all, necessary means are not enough to bring about most ends.
Finlay is thus wrong that ‘to intend the necessary means is to intend to act so as to bring the
end about’ (ibid.: 163). When necessary means are insufficient, to intend them is to intend to
partially bring about the end. To intend to act so as to (fully) bring about the end is instead to
intend sufficient means. Since any set of sufficient means includes any necessary means, the
description in terms of ‘intend the end’ and ‘intend sufficient means’ is complete without help
from  ‘intend  necessary  means’.  Further,  some  ends  lack  necessary  means. I  can  get  your
attention, say, by shouting, jumping, raising my hand, throwing my hat, or doing whatever else
might catch your eye. There is nothing I must do. Hence, while ‘intend necessary means’ does
not contribute anything  new to the combination of ‘intend sufficient means’ and ‘intend the
end’ when an end has necessary means, it does not contribute anything at all when an end lacks
such means. It is at best redundant and at worst irrelevant. That is, in effect, my argument in
this section.
4.2 Is this rule about necessary or sufficient means? If practical reason is our will, this rule is about
sufficient means. When an end lacks necessary means, there are none to take. When necessary
means  are  insufficient,  taking  them  is  not  enough  to  act  as  willed.  Such  an  exercise  is
incomplete. I can complete it only by taking sufficient means. The principle of practical reason
thus needs a rule about sufficient means. Otherwise, I can comply with the rules of practical
rationality without acting as willed.
That argument might seem to only imply that a rule about sufficient means augments
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one about necessary means in the principle of practical reason. The first, though, obviates the
second. A set of sufficient means includes any necessary ones. Although taking necessary means
is not enough to meet that correctness condition, taking sufficient means is in part because I
thereby take any necessary means. Hence, once the principle of practical reason includes a rule
about sufficient means, there is nothing for one about necessary means to explain.
Can we salvage the standard interpretation by claiming that when there are multiple sets
of sufficient means to my end, it is necessary that I take one of them? No. The proposition it is
necessary that I take some set of sufficient means is not the proposition  there is some set of means
which it is necessary for me to take. The latter proposition characterizes the notion of a necessary
means in the standard interpretation. The former proposition has nothing to do with that notion
of necessary means. In fact, it is just a long-winded way of stating a rule about sufficient means.
‘Necessary’ in it is a deontic modal. The proposition just says to take sufficient means. Why?
Because otherwise I will not pull off the end.
4.3 Is this rule about intending or taking means?  If practical reason is our will, this rule is about
taking means. Intending them is not enough to act as willed. Such an exercise is incomplete. I
can complete it only by taking means. The principle of practical reason thus needs a rule about
taking means. Otherwise, I can comply with the rules of practical rationality without acting as
willed.
That argument might seem to only imply that a rule about taking means augments one
about intending them in the principle of practical reason. The first, though, obviates the second.
Thinking and doing are interdependent parts of  an exercise of  practical  reason.  Thinking is
about doing which realizes thinking.  Although thinking is  not  enough for  me to meet  that
correctness condition, doing is in part because I can do only if I think. That is to say that I can
take means only if I intend them because of the way that what I am doing, and indeed whether I
am doing anything, depends on my thought about it. Hence, once the principle of practical
reason includes a rule about taking means, there is nothing for one about intending means to
explain.
4.4 Is this rule about believed or actual means? If practical reason is our will, this rule is about
actual means. Whenever believed means are not actual means, taking them does not help, and
might well hinder, my acting as willed. Such an exercise is at best incomplete. I can complete it
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only by taking actual means.  The principle of practical reason thus needs a rule about actual
means. Otherwise, I can comply with the rules of practical rationality without acting as willed.
That argument might seem to only imply that a rule about actual means augments one
about believed means in the principle of practical reason. The first, though, obviates the second.
Thinking and doing are interdependent parts of an exercise of practical reason. I act in some way
in order to achieve an end only if I so intend. I must believe that I can achieve that end by acting
that way, though, in order to so intend. I cannot sing your favorite song at karaoke in order to
woo you unless I believe that I can woo you by so serenading you. Although taking believed
means is not enough for me to meet that correctness condition, taking actual means is in part
because I take means only if I believe that they are means given how what I am doing, and
indeed whether I am doing anything at all, depends on my thought about it. Hence, once the
principle of practical reason includes a rule about actual means, there is nothing for one about
believed means to explain. 
4.5 To sum up, if practical reason is our will, my exercise of it is complete only if I act as I will to
act. To act as I will to act is to take, not merely intend, actual, not merely believed, sufficient, not
merely necessary, means to my end.  Since explicitly assuming that practical reason is our will
leads  to  that  alternative  interpretation,  the  standard  one  reflects  an  implicitly  assumed
separation of practical reason and the will. 
Once the principle of practical  reason includes a rule about taking actually sufficient
means, one about intending believed necessary means is at best redundant. The former can
explain  anything  the  latter  can,  and  the  latter  cannot  explain  everything  the  former  can.
Moreover, the latter excludes most of our practical activity from the ambit of reason.  Michael
Bratman is thus in a sense right and in a sense wrong to say that the standard  interpretation is ‘a
central aspect’ of the requirement ‘that an agent fill in her plans with one or another sufficient
means’ (Bratman 2009: 53n2). It  is an aspect of that broader rule. There he is right. It is  not
‘central’, though, because its application is limited while that of the broader rule is not and its
explanation is wholly derivative of that of the broader rule. There he is wrong.
5. Arguments against that alternative interpretion
In this section, I address objections to that interpretation of the instrumental rule. I argue that
they implicitly assume that practical reason is not the will and thus beg the question against that
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the view of practical reason which grounds that interpretation.
5.1 Against sufficient means.  Sarah Paul thinks that willing sufficient but not necessary means
cannot be part of an exercise of practical reason because it cannot ‘be ... regulated with respect
to some standard of correctness ... regarding the relation between means and ends’ (Paul 2013:
295). That standard ‘regulates’ that relation when (1) acting in some way is correct to the extent
that and because it contributes to achieving the end and (2) I will to act that way because of the
end,  where  that  is  the  ‘because’  of  rational  basing. She  claims that  following  a  rule  about
sufficient means cannot meet that second condition because whenever there is a set of sufficient
but not necessary means, there is at least one other. They are ‘equally rational ways of’ acting
with  respect  to  the  end, ‘reason  is  mute  as  to’ which to  will,  and  willing  one  is  thereby
‘plumping’ (ibid.:  295).  She thus claims that  since  a  rule  about  sufficient  means does not
ground willing sufficient but not necessary means  M rather than sufficient but not necessary
means N, I cannot will M because of E.
That argument, though, is unsound. I can will M because of E without grounds to will M
rather than N. When Paul says that ‘reason is mute as to’ which set of means to will, she means
that reason says the same thing about them. Each is better than any other way of acting according
to the standard which relates them to  E. Each is a correct set of means given this end. This
equality implies that this standard does not say of either that I must will it. That is compatible,
though, with it saying of each that I can will it. Just as I can follow a law which permits rather
than requires, so I can follow a rule of rationality which permits rather than requires. Just as I
comply with a law in giving you a £10 note in order to buy the book without grounds for paying
with a tener rather than two fivers, so I follow a rule of rationality in willing  M because of  E
without grounds for willing M rather than N.
One way to understand this argument is to compare practical inference with theoretical
inference. If I infer Q from Q and R if P and P, whether modus ponens regulates this inference
depends on whether I believe Q because Q and R if P and P. Whether I could infer R on the same
basis is irrelevant to the correctness of that inference. Similarly, if I infer M from E and E by either
M-ing or N-ing, whether the instrumental rule regulates this inference depends on whether I will
M because E and E by either M-ing or N-ing. Whether I could infer N on that basis is irrelevant to
the correctness of that inference. In both cases, whether I base my conclusion on my premises
instead depends on only the relationship between the conclusion and the premises.
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Equality thus does not threaten regulation and does not undermine an interpretation of
the instrumental rule in terms of sufficient means, at least without other assumptions. Which
assumptions? An implicit denial that practical reason is the will. Paul says that the problem with
willing  sufficient  but  not  necessary  means  is  that  ‘it  requires  no  further  judgment  of
choiceworthiness’ (ibid.:  296).  The  ‘further’  is  important.  The  claim  is  not  that  M is  not
choiceworthy given the end but that M is not more choiceworthy than N given the end. Paul infers
that willing  M is thereby not part of an exercise of practical reason. That inference is sound,
though, only if you assume that an exercise of practical reason consists in, or at least tracks, only
judgments about what there is most reason to do, where ‘most’ excludes ties. This assumption
is at odds with the correctness conditions of the exercise of a will and thus implicitly separates
practical reason from our will.
5.2 Against taking means. Kolodny claims that rules of rationality ‘demand that our attitudes be
related to one another in certain ways’ and focuses on the  ‘special class’ of  ‘requirements of
formal  coherence as  such’ (Kolodny 2008: 366).  He never explains why they concern only
attitudes. He says that ‘it seems relatively uncontroversial that rationality is a kind of coherence
or unity. So it is relatively clear how we might settle questions about what rationality requires; it
is whatever is necessary for coherence’ (Kolodny 2005: 511). Even if true, though, why need
these  rules  only  concern  attitudes?  Perhaps  acting  as  I  intend is  coherent,  failing  to  do so
incoherent. Why not?
Kolodny  explains  his  focus  on formal  coherence  in  a  way  which might  explain  the
restriction  to  attitudes.  He  divides  ‘requirements  governing  relations  among  attitudes
independently of anything beyond those attitudes’ into those which require formal coherence
and those which require informal coherence (Kolodny 2008: 392n2). Although all  meet his
stipulative definition of a rule of rationality, he claims that requirements of informal coherence
‘stretch our ordinary attributions of “irrationality”, which are restricted  to cases in which the
subject is more immediately at odds with himself ’ (ibid.: 392n2). Perhaps something is a rule of
rationality, then, only if violations can license ordinary attributions of irrationality. Although he
never considers whether such a rule can concern anything other than attitudes, he might reject
this possibility on those grounds.
That argument, though, is unsound. To the extent that there is a well-formed class of
ordinary attributions of irrationality, failing to act can be irrational. ‘You know exactly what to do
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and yet you are not doing it. That’s irrational!’ is about what you fail to do and yet is not for that
a  category  mistake.  Anyone  who teaches  or  writes  philosophy is  familiar  with  this  type  of
criticism. Few will say that they did not intend everything not done. I doubt that you will revoke
the charge if I explain that although I am not writing or reading or reflecting or ruminating even
though the time is right, I intend it all.  This attribution of irrationality is as ordinary as any
because I am as at odds with myself as anyone. Yet it concerns my failure to take means.
Kolodny might reply that despite appearances, this attribution concerns intending means
rather  than  taking  them  because  ‘an  action  comprises  an  intention-in-action  and  the
corresponding bodily movement, and the relation between an intention-in-action and the bodily
movement is not … a rational relation. It is purely causal’ (Kolodny 2005: 548n36). He might
claim that  attributions of  irrationality fundamentally  concern the  intention. He can say  that
although the whole action can inherit that property because one part possesses it, the other part
does not possess it, whether derivatively or fundamentally. That is to say that the thinking which
partially constitutes the action can be fundamentally irrational, the action can be derivatively
irrational, but the doing that also partially constitutes the action cannot be in any way irrational.
It is not a failure within the house of reason.
This argument invokes the causal theory of action, which decomposes human action
into an inner mental part within the reach of reason and an outer bodily part which is not. This
invocation is illegitimate. For one thing, this decomposition is a revisionist philosophical theory,
not  a  bit  of  ordinary  language  philosophy.  Ordinary  attributions  of  irrationality  do  not
presuppose  it.  For  another,  this  decomposition is  incompatible  with the  view that  practical
reason is our will. After all, (pure) efficient causation relates distinct existences whose essences
are constitutively independent of each other. The thinking and doing which jointly constitute an
exercise of practical reason then cannot each be what it is because of its relationship to the
other. If practical reason is our will, though, doing is as much a part of its exercise as thinking
because the relationship between them is rational, not (purely) efficient causal.9 Yet then failing
to take means can be fundamentally irrational and license an ordinary attribution of irrationality.
5.3  Against actual means. Maybe the conflict with ordinary attributions of irrationality is with a
rule about actual means. If my evidence is misleading, I might not take actual means to my end.
9 Philosophers developing the Aristotelian and Kantian trends often reject the causal theory. In addition to the
citations in footnote 2, see (Boyle and Lavin 2010), (Lavin 2014), (Ford 2014), and (Valaris 2015).
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If my belief about the means is false through no fault of my own, though, I am not ‘at odds with
myself’ but with the world. An attribution of irrationality is illegitimate. Hence, if something is a
rule of rationality only if  every violation licenses an attribution of irrationality, the alternative
interpretation of the instrumental rule is false.10
No rule  of  rationality,  though, is  such that  every  violation licenses  an attribution of
irrationality. Take modus ponens. I might believe that P, believe that Q if P, and yet not infer Q.
Whether I am irrational depends on why I do not infer. Maybe although I believe Q if P, I come
to believe P when the conditional is out of mind. Say on Monday I make a date with someone
for Friday and thus believe, indeed know, that if it is Friday, I have a date with him tonight.
Dinner, drinks, dancing, and all that jazz. Say on Friday morning, I believe, indeed know, that it
is Friday. I am then in a position to correctly infer and thereby know that I have a date with him
tonight. Yet I might not.11 Perhaps it slips my mind because of the whirl of life. Students to tutor,
lectures to give, meetings to attend, essays to mark, tasks to administer, and so on might so
consume my time, attention, and energy that I never think beyond the next moment. Perhaps
something more dramatic happens, like the loss of a limb or a loved one. I might then not infer
that I have a date tonight without being irrational and while knowing the propositions which
license this inference. After all, if, in the middle of it all, I think ‘Wait. I made a date with him for
Friday, and today is Friday. I have a date tonight!’  and don my dancing shoes, I infer from
grounds already possessed. If I do not, though, I violate modus ponens. If I do not show up to
dine  and  drink  and  dance,  I  violate  the  instrumental  rule.  Yet  ordinary  attributions  of
irrationality are inappropriate if the explanation for why I violate it excuses. (For what it is worth,
these types of excuses also show that some violations of the standard interpretation do not
license ordinary attributions of irrationality.)
Ordinary attributions of irrationality do not track violations of rules of rationality. They
track culpable violations.  Every violation licenses  an attribution of irrationality,  then, only if
every  violation  is  culpable.  As  far  as  I  can  tell,  every  violation  is  culpable  only  if  rules  of
rationality include awareness conditions such that they apply only when I am simultaneously
occurently aware of every attitude and action (or lack thereof) which they concern (see Lee
2018b).  Whether  these awareness conditions make sense in another account of  these rules,
10 You can make the same objection against the other aspects of that interpretation. After all, when I do not take
actually sufficient means through no fault of my own, I do not take actually sufficient means through no fault of my
own. I ignore this complication because my response generalizes in an obvious way.
11 (Koziolek forthcoming: §2) discusses the importance of this case for an account of belief.
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though, they are incompatible with the constitutivist metaphysics. Given this metaphysics, a
rule of rationality constitutes a correctness condition for the exercise of a self-conscious capacity.
If practical reason is the will, one of these conditions is to act as willed. I violate that rule if I do
not  take  actually  sufficient  means  to  my  end,  which  can  happen  even  if  I  am  never
simultaneously occurently aware of every attitude or action (or lack thereof) which it concerns.
Forgetting my date does not exempt me from that rule when I do not show up even though I
can only take sufficient means to it by walking there then. Every violation of a rule of rationality
licenses an ordinary attribution to irrationality, then, only if practical reason is not the will.
5.4. Practical philosophers cannot put aside their differences in order to discuss the instrumental
rule because its formulation depends on views about the nature of our agency. Interpretations of
it are as disputable as anything else in practical philosophy. To endorse one is to take a stand on
whether  the  reach  of  reason  extends  only  to  thinking  or  beyond  to  doing.  The  standard
interpretation implies that our agency is fundamentally the potentiality to think, the alternative
that it is fundamentally the potentiality to realize thought in action. Which is correct depends
on our nature. Fundamentally, can we only think, or can we do as well? If practical reason is our
will, our agency is fundamentally a potentiality to realize concepts or to act from thought about
action. The instrumental rule codifies an aspect of that potentiality by saying to take actually
sufficient means to my ends. 
6. The normative status of the instrumental rule
Most discussions of this rule assume an account of its content and focus on its normative status.
In  this  section,  I  argue  that  meeting  it  is  a  necessary  but  insufficient  condition  on  the
correctness  of  an  exercise  of  practical  reason.  Just  as  I  only  argue  that  if  the  constitutivist
metaphysics of practical reason as our type of will is correct, so is my interpretation of this rule,
so I shall only argue that if that metaphysics is correct, so is my account of the normative status
of this rule.
6.1 Is success in an exercise of practical reason bound up with following this rule? ‘No’ might
seem like  the  answer.  If  my end is  immoral  or  imprudent,  taking means to  it  is  incorrect.
Whether taking means is correct thus depends in part on whether having the end is correct. Yet
since the instrumental rule does not discriminate between ends, it might seem to imply that
taking  means  to  incorrect  ends  is  correct.  If  so,  it  is  extensionally  inadequate  and  lacks
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normative status.
The basic  structure of  the objection is  clear,  its  details  and soundness  less so.  They
depend on assumptions about the nature of normativity. For example, if you assume that facts
about reasons exhaust the fundamental level of normative reality, the objection is that since the
instrumental rule does not discriminate between ends supported by reasons and ends not, it
does not track reasons to act. It implies that I have sufficient reason to take means when I
actually have decisive reason to not act that way because I have decisive reason against the end.
If you instead assume that facts about goodness exhaust the fundamental level of normative
reality, the objection is that since this rule does not discriminate between good and bad ends, it
does not track which ways to act are good. It implies that taking certain means is good when in
fact acting that way is bad because the end is bad. Anyone who accepts some such account of
the nature of normativity must deny the normative status of this rule, explain what the objection
gets wrong, or accommodate the objection by weakening the rule.12 
Those are the options, though, only if the assumed account of the nature of normativity
legitimizes the objection. The constitutivist metaphysics does not. On it, the instrumental rule
partially specifies the nature of practical reason. Exercises of that capacity are thereby subject to
a standard which includes that rule. An exercise is thus correct  only if I take sufficient means.
That rule does not specify other properties an exercise needs in order to be correct, but it is
compatible with further correctness conditions. If there are such further conditions, there are
other rules which also partially characterize practical reason. 
This objection assumes that there are correct ends which partially determine how to
exercise practical reason. It thereby assumes that there is a rule of rationality which concerns
ends that  partially  specifies  the  nature  of  that  capacity.  That  rule  is  as  much a part  of  the
standard for exercises as is the instrumental rule. Meeting it is as necessary to the correctness of
those exercises as is meeting the instrumental rule. To exercise practical reason in a way that
violates it is thus incorrect according to the normative standard of which the instrumental rule is
a part. The fact that the instrumental rule does not discriminate between ends is then irrelevant.
There is no extensional inadequacy and no illicit bootstrapping.
12 Kolodny denies the normative status of this rule (Kolodny 2005). John Broome, at least at one time, rejects the
objection by interpreting this rule as a wide-scope norm which requires that I either take means or give up my end
(Broome 2007). Kieran Setiya rejects the objection by claiming that this rule is a rule of theoretical rationality with
epistemic but not practical normativity (Setiya 2007). Mark Schroeder weakens the rule by claiming that it grounds
a reason to take means which is defeated when I have incorrect ends (Schroeder 2005). There are many other
examples.
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The  only  other  way  to  try  to  legitimize  this  objection  within  the  constitutivist
metaphysics  is  to  deny  that  there  are  rules  of  practical  rationality  about  ends.  On  that
metaphysics, there are then no correct or incorrect ends. The fact that the instrumental rule
does not discriminate between ends is again irrelevant, this time because there is no distinction
to track. There is no extensional inadequacy and no illicit bootstrapping.
Assume the constitutivist metaphysics, then, and the objection is self-undermining. If
there are incorrect ends, the aspect of practical reason which explains why also explains why an
exercise in which I take sufficient means to them is incorrect. If there are no incorrect ends, an
exercise in which I take sufficient means to any end is correct.
6.2  Since the explanation for why that objection is self-undermining invokes another rule of
rationality, the significance of the instrumental rule might seem doubtful. Why not think that
the rule which explains why taking means to incorrect ends is incorrect also explains why taking
means to correct ends is correct? That other rule seems to do all the work. In what way, then,
does the instrumental rule tell me what to do?
The answer turns on understanding a difference between the question about the status
of this rule given the constitutivist metaphysics and the question about its status given other
accounts of the nature of normativity. Although I shall not discuss other accounts in detail, they
understand  the  question  about  its  status  as  about  the  truth  of  the  conditional  ‘ I  exercise
practical reason correctly  if I follow the instrumental rule’. After all, only then do instances in
which taking means is incorrect challenge that status. Assume the constitutivist metaphysics,
though, and the question about its status is about the the truth of the conditional ‘I exercise
practical reason correctly only if I follow the instrumental rule’. An exercise that does not meet
this rule is incorrect at least in part because I do not take sufficient means. An exercise in which
I  take  such means,  in  contrast,  is  thereby  to  that  extent,  but  only  to  that  extent,  correct.
Likewise for other rules  of  practical  rationality.  Taking sufficient  means is  thus a perfection,
failing to do so an imperfection, in the exercise of practical reason.
Perhaps an analogy helps. Consider a recipe. Each step tells me what to do. To make the
dish correctly, I must meet each correctness condition. If I bungle the first step, that dish is
ruined. The irrelevance of the third step in that instance, though, does not show that it is never
significant. If I pull off the other steps but muck up it, this dish is ruined. Yet the other steps do
not explain why. Similarly, if the recipe has five ingredients, buying the wrong type of the first is
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enough to ruin it regardless of whether I buy the right or the wrong type of the others. That,
though, does not show that the third ingredient is insignificant. If I buy the right type of the
others but the wrong type of it, the recipe is ruined. Correctness requires buying all the right
ingredients and following all the steps in order.
An exercise of practical reason is likewise correct if and only if and because I meet the
rules of practical rationality. An incorrect end undermines an exercise. The irrelevance of the
instrumental rule in that exercise, though, does not show that it is never significant. Having a
proper end but not taking sufficient means also undermines an exercise. Yet a rule concerning
ends does not explain why. Having a good end is essential to exercising practical reason well but
it is not enough to do so, as is taking sufficient means.
I am here aping a form of explanation which certain philosophers inspired by Aristotle
and Kant use to explain the unity of the virtues. For example, John McDowell claims that ‘the
particular virtues are not a batch of independent sensitivities. Rather, we use the concepts of the
particular virtues to mark similarities and dissimilarities among the manifestations of a single
sensitivity, which is what virtue, in general, is’ (McDowell 1979: 53). A specific virtue term,
then, picks out an aspect, its corresponding vice term the lack of that aspect, of a virtuous
character.  Possessing  each  aspect  is  necessary  but  insufficient  for  a  virtuous  character,  and
lacking any is sufficient but not necessary for the lack of a virtuous character. Possessing them all
is jointly sufficient for a virtuous character.
McDowell emphasizes the way in which ‘no one virtue can be fully possessed except by
a  possessor  of  all  of  them’  (ibid.:  53).  Edward  Harcourt  points  out  that  the  possibility  of
possessing aspects of a virtuous character to an incomplete degree implies that correct action
has ‘layers’ which can come apart in cases of incompetence or wickedness (Harcourt 2016: 227-
33). Given that a virtuous agent is someone who acts correctly and given that the instrumental
rule is part of the principle of our capacity to act, this rule is part of that story. It is a layer which
can come apart from others in imperfect actions but which is part of every perfect action. More
straightforwardly, you can meet it and yet act imperfectly, but you cannot act perfectly without
meeting it because taking sufficient means is part, though only part, of what makes an action
correct or virtuous.
Korsgaard connects this view of the unity of virtue with a view of the unity of the rules of
practical rationality. She claims that there
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is really only one virtue, but there are many different vices, different ways of falling from
virtue, and when we assign someone a particular virtue, what we really mean is that she
does not have the corresponding vice. In a similar way, there is only one principle of
practical reason, the categorical imperative viewed as the law of autonomy, but there are
different ways to fall away from autonomy, and the different principles of practical reason
really instruct us not to fall away from our autonomy in these different ways.
 (Korsgaard 2009: 71-2)
Each rule of practical rationality partially specifies the principle of practical reason just as each
virtue  partially  specifies  that  single  sensitivity.  Jointly  those  rules  completely  specify  that
principle just as jointly those virtues completely specify that sensitivity. With respect to each
rule,  meeting it  is  necessary but insufficient  for  the correctness of  the exercise just  as with
respect to each virtue,  possessing it  is  necessary but insufficient  for the virtuousness of  my
character. With respect to each rule, failing to meet it is sufficient but not necessary for the
incorrectness of the exercise just as with respect to each virtue, failing to possess it is sufficient
but  not  necessary  for  the  lack  of  a  virtuous  character.  Meeting  every  rule  is  sufficient  for
correctness because jointly they fully specify the principle of practical reason just as possessing
every virtue is sufficient for a virtuous character because jointly they fully specify that sensitivity.
There is thus only one principle of practical reason, which consists of all of the rules of
practical  rationality.  It  is,  and thus  they are,  thereby normative  for  the  exercise  of  practical
reason. Although not every exercise which meets the instrumental rule is correct, every correct
exercise is so in part because the agent takes sufficient means. Likewise for any other rule of
practical rationality. The instrumental rule thus has the same normative and explanatory status
as any rule of rationality, at least on the assumption of the constitutivist metaphysics of practical
reason understood as our will.
7. Self-conscious animal life
The central question of this essay is  ‘If constitutivism is true and practical reason is our will,
what is the content of the instrumental rule and what is its normative status?’ The answer is that
this  rule  codifies  a necessary but insufficient  correctness  condition for  exercises  of  practical
reason which says to take actually sufficient means to ends.  That interpretation is part of the
practical  cognitivism behind certain  Aristotelian  and Kantian  trends  in  practical  philosophy
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whose core is that the reach of reason extends beyond thinking to doing. Whether it is correct
depends on whether it rings true upon reflection and constitutes self-knowledge of our agency
in the world. The only way to know is to develop it. We need a full our agency in the world as
practical cognitivism paints it if we are to determine whether this world, this agency, is ours. An
account  of  the  instrumental  rule  is  but  a  first  few  brush  strokes  in  this  painting,  though
indispensable indeed.
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